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1. Introduction 
One of the key purposes of NPP power system protection is to ensure that NPP's local 
power demand (such as cooling pumps, control systems, etc.) are met under all 
circumstances even during faulted periods. To achieve this goal, NPP power system 
protection must ensure that it can supply these local loads using either (1) power from the 
grid (via the transmission connection, which in most time, however, are used for exporting 
the excess power generated by the NPP after supplying its local loads) or (2) power from 
local generations such as diesel generators, batteries, etc. at all times and under all 
circumstances.  
On the first power source (grid power), many NPPs worldwide have been built along the 
seashore for cooling water availability reasons. Overhead transmission lines are thus built in 
the vicinity of the seashore to transport the large amount of power generated from the NPP 
to the grid economically. As these overhead lines are exposed to salt contamination, 
flashover will occur when contamination becomes excessive. In the event of flashover, 
which is equivalent to a line-to-ground fault, the plant’s protection system will need to 
initiate a series of switching operation to redirect the large power output from the NPP to a 
backup route in order to avoid reactor emergency shut-down. However, such switching has 
the adverse effect of causing undesirable transient overvoltages to propagate in the plant’s 
local power grid [1-4]. Dealing with the frequent switching actions of these overhead lines 
while mitigating their adverse effects thus becomes the first challenge of designing NPP 
power system protection. 
Once the NPP loses its connection to the grid, it will need to rely on the local generation to 
continue supplying its local loads. Most NPP use multiple "independent" sources as backup 
power. However, unless NPP's local power grid is properly configured and its protection 
system properly designed, these "independent" sources can all fail at the same time as 
manifested in Taipower's 18 March, 2001 Level 2 event ("318 Event") [5].  
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In the following sections, we will examine Taipower's "318 Event" in detail to demonstrate 
the various possibilities that could lead to NPP plant blackout. Moreover, as these 
possibilities are not mutually exclusive, we will use this example to illustrate how multiple 
or cascaded problem can present further challenges to the overall NPP power system 
protection design. Recommended preventive measures are then summarized in the final 
section of this chapter.  
2. Taipower "318 Event" 
2.1. System configuration  
Figure 1 shows the configuration of Taipower 3rd nuclear power plant. The NPP has two 951 
MW generators which are connected to the local 345kV gas-insulated substation (GIS) in one-
and-half breaker configuration as shown in Fig. 1. The NPP is then connected to the power 
grid via four 345 kV overhead power lines (Darpen 1, 2 and Lunchi Sea/Mountain) to the 
Darpen and Lunchi 345kV EHV (Extra High Voltage) substation and two 161kV overhead 
lines (Kengting and Fengkang) to Kenging and Fenkang 161kV HV (High Voltage) substation. 
It is important to note that there are three 13.8 kV buses (in the middle) and four 4.16 kV 
buses (at the bottom) for plant utility. Among these buses, the two 4.16 kV buses in the 
middle are responsible for feeding the safety-critical equipment such as cooling pumps and 
are designated as “essential buses”. (The 2nd 4.16kV bus from the left where "DGA (Diesel 
Generator A)" is connected is designated as "Essential Bus A". The one next to it, where 
"DGB" is connected to, is "Essential Bus B".) 
Another notable but subtle feature of this configuration is the use of 3-phase gas-insulated 
line (GIL) design with the 3 phases enclosed in a single duct of approximately 340 meters for 
the connection of the generation units and auxiliary systems, (located at the foot of a hill) to 
the 345kV GIS (on the top of the hill) due to topography feature of the location. This feature 
has implication on the generation and propagation of switching transients which will be 
explained in later sections. 
2.2. Event sequence  
On 18 March, 2001, a Level 2 event occurred at Taipower’s 3rd NPP, and the whole plant 
went into blackout from 00:45 to 02:58. The event started at 00:45 when EHV CB3510 (see 
Fig. 1, highlighted in red) was closed to energize the then-offline 345 kV/13.8 kV/4.16 kV 
start-up transformer (X01). Upon CB3510 closure, medium voltage (MV) CB#17 on "Essential 
Bus A" exploded damaging not only CB#17 but also CB#15. CB#15 formed a permanent 
ground fault keeping "Essential Bus A" at ground potential thus Essential Bus A became 
useless. CB #3 and #5 on "Essential Bus B" was then opened hoping DGB will start and 
supply power to those critical loads. However, DGB failed to start and the whole plant went 
into blackout. The only hope remained at that time was DG5 (on the far right in Fig. 1) 
which, however, needs to be started locally and manually. After 2 hour since the first 
problem occurred, DG5 was finally started and started to supply power to the critical loads 
via "Essential Bus B".  
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Figure 1. System Configuration of the NPP 
 
 
Figure 2. 345kV and 161kV Overhead Line Switching Event Log 
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Figure 2 shows the switching event log of the four 345kV and two 161kV lines connecting to 
the NPP. After reviewing the event log, it was found that CB#17 on Essential Bus A broke 
down when one GIS switching operation was occurring. The event log also showed that 
there were 37 EHV switching operations during the 48-hour period prior to the event due to 
salt-fog influence in the plant area. Because of the unstable offsite power, the GIS switched 
between different offsite power to acquire the stable power sources.  
Figure 3 shows the transient recording of overvoltages for both the 345kV bus and one MV 
(medium voltage) bus at 20:38 in March, 2001. At t0, the flashover on the 345kV line 
occurred leading to its subsequent tripping at t1. The tripping took place on the remote end 
of the 345kV line thus overvoltage can still be observed at the NPP between t1 and t2 due to 
“motor-generating effects” to be explained in the following section of this Chapter. The 
overvoltage on the 345kV line eventually caused flashover from Phases A and B to ground 
pulling down the line voltage and all motors on the 4.16kV bus were tripped by their 
respective under voltage relays at t3. At t4, the flashover from Phases A and B to ground 
was cleared and the “motor-generating effects” start to build up the voltages again with the 
two remaining motors on the 13.8kV bus.  
 
 
Figure 3. Overvoltages at 20:38 in March 17, 2001 
(a) Transient Recording at 345 kV GIS
(b) Line-to-Line Voltage Transient Recording of one 13.8 kV motor, Recycle Colling Pump B 
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2.3. Electrical stress in plant power system  
2.3.1. Line conductor overvoltages due to over-excitation and nonlinear resonance [6,7] 
The transient recorder in Fig. 3(a) recorded 2 abnormal overvoltages (at 56 Hz and 45 Hz, 
respectively) after the last 345 kV-transmission line connecting to the NPP was tripped on 
the remote end which turned the NPP into an electrical island. As will be explained in the 
next section, the 1st overvoltage was caused by the over-excitation of the motors (e.g. recycle 
water pump) in the plant who, with terminal voltages supported by large line capacitance, 
now operated as induction generator after loss of external power.  
The 2nd overvoltage is caused by a different mechanism. After a few cycles the low voltage 
relays tripped many of the plant motors leaving only 2 biggest motor (now operating as 
induction generator) still connected and were supported by a comparatively much larger 
capacitance leading to not only over-excitation but also magnetic saturation of both the 
motors and transformers. This created a condition very close to ferroresonance resulting in 
even bigger overvoltage. 
2.3.2. Neutral voltage transfer  
It can be seen from Figure 3 that overvoltage were observed not only on the line conductors 
of phase A, B, and C but also on the neutral. As will be explained in the next section, neutral 
voltage transfer can occure through 2 different mechanisms: electromagnetic and capacitive 
transfer.  
In the presence of transformer core saturation, 3rd harmonic neutral voltage will be present 
on the windings through electromagnetic transfer as long as the neutrals of the respective 
windings are not grounded. In the presence of neutral voltage on any of the transformer 
windings, the stray capacitance among the windings and earth will result in capacitive 
neutral voltage transfer.   
2.3.3. Switching surges on both EHV and MV systems 
From Fig. 2, it can be seen that there were 37 switching operations during the 48-hour period 
prior to the breakdown. This unusually high number of switching operation can create lots 
of switching surges  (with magnitude of around 7 times the rated line-to-ground peak 
voltage in the medium voltage system) which, when propagating through the NPP local 
power network, can degrade the insulation level or even cause breakdown of CB's in the 
local power network [8,9].  
It should be noted that while there were 37 switching operations on the EHV side, none of 
the  switching surges were captured by the transient recorder in the 345kV GIS in Fig. 3(a) 
due to insufficient bandwidth of the transient recorder. In a follow-up field test [9] after the 
event, it was found that such switching often causes switching surges of around 7 times the 
rated line-to-ground peak voltage! 
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3. Stress mechanism and modeling 
It can be seen from the above that Taipower's 3rd NPP was under sigificant and multiple 
stresses before and during the Level 2 event. This section explains the mechanisms working 
behind these stresses and provide basic principles how to model them.  
3.1. Line conductor overvoltages due to over-excitation and nonlinear resonance 
[6,7]  
Figure 3 shows that on Phases A, B, and C there were two overvoltages observed where the 
second overvoltage was slightly higher than the first. Causes of these 2 overvoltages are 
detailed as following. 
3.1.1. First overvoltage (56Hz) – Over excitation 
Figure 4 shows the 2 essential condition for induction motor generating effect: large 
capacitance and continuous rotating motor. When an induction motor lost its external 
voltage source, the flywheel with large inertia will keep the motor rotating and the 
capacitance of transmission line will provide the necessary voltage support for the induction 
motor to act as a generator. The magnitization curve of the motor and the amount of 
capacitance will jointly determine the overall motor generating effect as shown in Fig. 5. If 
the capacitance is too small to provide enough magnetizing current (curve C0 in Fig. 5), the 
terminal voltage of motor will decay exponentially and the generating effect will not 
sustain. However, if the capacitance is large enough, the motor generating effect will sustain 
and the  terminal voltage is determined by the intersection of the capacitance and 
magnetizing curve such as ( V1, C1) and (V2, C2) in Fig. 5. 
 
Figure 4. Equivalent Circuit of Motor-Generating Effect. 
At "t1" in Fig. 3(a), the last 345kV transmission line connecting to the NPP was tripped on 
remote end due to a flashover on the line turning the NPP into an electrical island. As the 
local end of the 345kV line did not trip, a motor generating condition equivalent to Fig. 4 
was formed with the 127kM transmission line providing sufficient capacitance to support 
the voltage of the various motors in the NPP. As can be seen in Fig. 3(b), the terminal 
voltage is increased to 1.4 p.u. and the overall resultant frequency is 56 Hz.  
During this first overvoltage period, the terminal voltage of motor was about 1.4 p.u. (Fig. 
3(b)) but the line voltage was about 1.29 times the rated line-to-ground peak voltage (Fig. 
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3(a)). This implied that the power transformers have saturated. As a result, a lot of 
harmonics were produced and the zero sequence components of them would be integrated 
into the neutral voltage resulting in unexpected high neutral voltage. This period ended at 
"t2" in Fig. 3(a) when the flashover grounded both phase A and B. 
 
Figure 5. Relationships between Motor Terminal Voltage, Magnetization Curve, and External 
Capacitance 
Table 1 shows the harmonic contents of B phase voltage between t1 and t2 in Fig. 3(a). The 
even order harmonics and DC component could be treated as the slight magnetic bias 
caused by asymmetric fault. At this stage, there was no ferromagnetic resonance in the 
island system. 
 
Order DC 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
% 9.3 100 7.8 8.0 3.6 13.5 1.6 6.1 1.2 
Table 1. Voltage Harmonic Contents of Phase B between t1 and t2 
3.1.2. Second overvoltage (45 Hz) - Nonlinear resonance 
Figure 6 shows the four essential conditions for a ferroresonance to occur: voltage source, 
capacitance, nonlinear inductance (ferromagnetic and saturable), and low losses. The R in 
the RLC resonant circuit in Fig. 6 is very large due to the "low losses" condition and can 
often be ignored. The nonlinear inductance L is the magnetizing curve of the motors and 
transformers in the system and the capacitance is provided by the transmission line. 
At "t3" in Fig. 3(a), all the motors on the 4.16 kV system were tripped by undervoltage relay. 
Between t3 and t4, the flashover grounding of phases A and B were cleared and the motor 
generating effects mentioned above picked up again gradually re-establishing the line 
voltage. At "t4" in Fig. 3(a), most motors in 13.8 kV system were also tripped by 
undervoltage relay with the exception of two largest ones. With the capacitance provided by 
the transmission line now need only to support the terminal voltage of 2 motors, we would 
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expect the terminal voltages to be higher than those during the first overvoltage stage 
according to Fig. 5. However, due to deep saturation of the motors and transformers, the 
overvoltage magnitude in Fig. 3(b) during the 2nd overvoltage is only slightly higher than 
the previous stage. This can be further seen from the fact that at the beginning of “t4” in Fig. 
3(a), there were no overvoltage and no distortion of waveforms. As line voltage increased, 
the harmonics increased and after a few cycles the amplitude of voltage remained but 
voltage waveform distorted dramatically. Figure 7 shows the waveform at 4 cycle prior to t5 
with its Fourier components summarized in  Table 2 [10]. 
 
Figure 6. Equivalent RLC Circuit 
 
Figure 7. Zoom-in of The 4 Cycles prior to t5 
It can be seen from Table 2 that the voltage of fundamental frequency was about 1.5 times 
the rated line-to-ground peak voltage, which is slightly larger than the previous 
overvoltage. The large DC and even-order harmonics indicate the deep saturation of the 
start-up transformer. In Table 2 the total of 3rd harmonics is 554.7 kVpeak (Note: The 3rd 
harmonics are in-phase therefore can be added up directly.) Comparing this figure with the 
neutral voltage of 626 kVpeak in Fig. 3(a), this indicates that 3rd harmonics is the main source 
of neutral voltage during the second overvoltage period. 
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order 
Phase A Phase B Phase C 
Vpeak %fund. Vpeak %fund. Vpeak %fund. 
0 175.068 0.429 48.279 0.113 71.93 0.017 
1 408.273 1.0 427.991 1.0 413.726 1.0 
2 108.386 0.265 47.287 0.11 39.829 0.096 
3 179.679 0.44 179.734 0.42 195.357 0.472 
4 41.29 0.101 28.313 0.066 24.702 0.06 
5 28.13 0.069 30.829 0.072 65.626 0.159 
6 13.036 0.044 10.364 0.024 22.34 0.054 
7 12.562 0.031 22.126 0.052 37.579 0.091 
8 15.84 0.039 28.219 0.066 7.708 0.019 
9 14.315 0.035 8.207 0.019 39.509 0.095 
10 9.428 0.023 16.289 0.038 6.203 0.015 
11 18.092 0.044 14.962 0.035 27.434 0.066 
12 18.805 0.046 27.966 0.065 25.323 0.061 
13 15.387 0.038 11.466 0.027 22.233 0.054 
14 15.717 0.038 10.323 0.027 24.685 0.06 
15 13.897 0.037 24.991 0.058 13.998 0.034 
16 1.992 0 36.961 0.086 12.173 0.029 
Table 2. Fourier Analysis of Fig. 7 
As the inductances in the systems are now deeply saturated, there is a possibility that 
ferroresonance can occur. (Note: Ferroresonance is nonlinear resonances in power system 
where the voltage and current may change from normal steady state to another steady state 
with large harmonic distortion.) The phenomenon can be best understood from a circuit 
perspective using Figure 6 as example. In Fig. 6, the total equivalent impedance of the circuit 
is (jXL - jXC). When the inductance is saturated and current further increases, it will drive the 
inductor into deeper saturation where the inductor impedance jXL will reduce when current 
further increases. A critical point will be reached at Point B in Figure 8 when (jXL - jXC) 
becomes zero. Any current increase beyond Point B will cause the total impedance change 
from a positive value to a negative value causing resonance effects near this operating 
point[7].  
Based on analysis of all available data, it is believed that the 2nd overvoltage from t4 onward 
is on the boundary to be ferroresonance therefore the 2nd overvoltage is caused by a 
combination of motor-generating effect and nonlinear resonance.  
3.2. Neutral voltage transfer [10] 
It can be seen from Figure 3 that overvoltage can be observed not only on the line conductor 
but also on the neutral conductor as well. In order to understand this phenomenon we need 
to look at Fig. 9 where the equivalent circuit of a transformer is shown including its stray 
capacitances.  
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Figure 8. Ferroresonance Phenomenon Explanation 
 
Figure 9. Voltage Transfer Diagram of 345 kV/4.16 kV Transformer 
3.2.1. Transformer modeling 
In Fig. 9, CHE and CLE depict the stray capacitance between high voltage (HV) winding to 
ground, and low voltage (LV) winding to ground, respectively, while CHL depicts the stray 
capacitance between HV and LV windings. Typical stray capacitances for the 
345/13.8/4.16kV power transformer are shown in Table 3.  
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In the presence of transformer core saturation, 3rd harmonic neutral voltage will be present 
on the windings through electromagnetic transfer as long as the neutrals of the respective 
windings are not grounded. Once the neutral voltage is established on any side of the 
neutrals, the stray capacitance provides a further path for it to transfer to other neutrals 
according to Equation (1) 
 0 0/ / ( )L H HL HL LEE E C C C    (1) 
where EH0  is the neutral voltage at HV side, and EL0  is the neutral voltage at LV side. 
 
Item C345/Earth C13.8/Earth C4.16/Earth C345/13.8 C13.8/4.16 C345/4.16 
Capacitance 4.48 nF 13.76 nF 21.92 nF 4.3 nF 214.86 pF 8.96 nF 
Table 3. Stray Capacitance of the 345kV/13.8kV/4.16kV Power Transformer 
3.2.2. Neutral voltage transfer 
It can be seen from Fig. 3(a) that, during 1st overvoltage the neutral voltage gradually roses 
to 200 kVrms while during 2nd overvoltage the neutral voltage rose to 626 kVpeak (Note: the 
voltage waveform became very non-sinusoidal during 2nd overvoltage, we thus use peak 
value instead of rms value). The source of both overvoltages in the neutral was due to motor 
and transformer saturation resulting in 3rd harmonic voltages at the neutral however during 
the 2nd overvoltage the waveform is much more distorted with higher harmonic content.  
As indicated by Fig. 3(a), the neutral on 345kV side does not appear to have been effective 
grounded possibly due to grounding failure. The result is that very high neutral voltage was 
established on the 345kV neutral and if the 4.16kV neutral was not grounded it will see a 
neutral voltage (through capacitive neutral transfer) of  
8.96
200 * 58.03
8.96 21.92
nF
kVrms kVrms
nF nF
  
8.96
626 * 181.54
8.96 21.92
nF
kVpeak kVpeak
nF nF
  
during 1st and 2nd overvoltages, respectively. To better appreciate various grounding 
combination's effect on the neutral voltage transfer, 3 simulations were conducted assuming 
grounding conditions as per Table 4 and their results are summarized in Table 5.  
 
Item 345kV side 13.8kV side 4.16kV side 
Case 1 Ground (direct) Ground (8 Ω) Ground (2.4 Ω) 
Case 2 Non-Ground Non-Ground Non-Ground 
Case 3 Non-Ground Ground (8 Ω) Ground (2.4 Ω) 
Table 4. Grounding Condition for Simulating Capacitive Transfer 
Table 5 shows that as the neutral voltages transferred to the 4.16kV bus can be as high as 13 
times the phase-to-ground peak voltage which can pose significant threat to CB#17 as well 
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as other CB's. However, if the neutral systems were properly configured, the risk can be 
minimized greatly. 
 
 
345kV side 
Phase Voltage 
345kV side 
Neutral Voltage 
4.16kV side 
Neutral Voltage 
Case 1 457.55 kVpeak 0 kVpeak 0 kVpeak 
Case 2 450.6 kVpeak 275.88 kVpeak 42.29 kVpeak 
Case 3 448.93 kVpeak 44.58 kVpeak 0.002 kVpeak 
(a) 1st overvoltage 
 
345kV side 
Phase Voltage 
345kV side 
Neutral Voltage 
4.16kV side 
Neutral Voltage 
Case 1 428.83 kVpeak 0 kVpeak 0 kVpeak 
Case 2 418.7 kVpeak 263.43 kVpeak 41.08 kVpeak 
Case 3 420.94 kVpeak 46.25 kVpeak 0.002 kVpeak 
(b) 2nd overvoltage 
Table 5. Capacitive Transfer Simulation Result 
3.3. Switching surges and Very Fast Transient Overvoltage (VFTO) 
Switching operations are the most prominent phenomenon in the “318 Event”. During the 
48 hours prior to the Level 2 event, there were 37 switching operations and each could cause 
switching surges. Switching surges caused by GIS switching is characterized by its 
nanosecond wavefront and is commonly referred to as Very Fast Transient Overvoltage 
(VFTO) [11].  
VFTO is the phenomenon of transient overvoltage generated during switching operation 
characterized by very short rise-time of 4 to 100 ns and has been covered by various 
literatures [3,12-22]. The phenomenon is particularly significant during Disconnect Switch 
(DS) operation due to multiple-restriking in the DS due to lack of arc-suppressing 
chamber. 
3.3.1. Field measurement 
In the past, VFTO was not considered to be possible to transfer from EHV through power 
transformer to medium voltage (MV) system [12-14]. However, in light of the “318 Event”, a 
field test was conducted in Taipower 3rd NPP during plant overhaul by switching the DS of 
EHV GIS and measure the voltage on “Essential Bus A”.  
Field test result [9] shows that after switching the DS of EHV GIS, multiple 25 kV-level 
restrikes (approximately 7 times the rated line-to-ground peak voltage) were measured on 
the 4.16kV bus indicating VFTO can be transferred from the EHV side to MV side. It also 
indicates that the maximum peak voltages measured on the 4.16kV bus occur neither on the 
first strike nor on the last strike, and this behaviour is quite different with that in EHV 
system. The measurement results are shown in Fig. 10.  
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Figure 10. Switching Surge Measured on 4.16kV Bus by Operating EHV GIS Disconnect-Switch. (Note: 
The bandwidth of the measurement system was 2MS/s, the highest achievable in 2003) 
3.3.2. VFTO simulation 
To further appreciate VFTO transfer mechanism, numerical simulation model was built [23]. 
To validate this simulation model, the field test condition for Fig. 10 was reconstructed and 
the simulation result is shown in Fig. 11. It can be seen from Fig. 11 that the waveform 
envelope are consistent with measurement for both DS opening and closing and that the 
maximum VFTO on the essential bus occurred neither at first nor at last strike. 
We then change the DS operation angle for each 5° intervals to simulate different 
closing/opening condition and Table 6 and 7 summarizes the maximum EHV inter-contact 
breakdown voltage vs. maximum MV VFTO. The following can be observed from Table 6 
and 7:   
1. The VFTO transferred to the essential bus A can be as high as 28.77 kV, which is about 
8.47 times the rated line-to-ground peak voltage. 
2. For all simulations, the restrike that causes the maximum VFTO on “Essential Bus A” 
does not necessarily coincide with the one that caused the max inter-contact breakdown 
voltage on EHV side. 
3. Among the 36 simulations for DS opening, the simulation that produces the highest 
inter-contact breakdown voltage on EHV side is not the same as the one that produces 
(a) GIS-DS opening 
(b) GIS-DS closing 
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the maximum VFTO on “Essential Bus A”. This is also true for DS closing. E.g., Case 
#28 (δoper = 135°) of DS opening produces the highest VFTO in MV system (28.77 kV) 
while it was Case #18 (δoper=85°) that produces the highest inter-contact breakdown 
voltage on EHV side (354.2 kV). 
 
Figure 11. Simulation of VFTO at the Field Measurement Point 
 
Item 
Among the Multiple Restrikes Total Num. 
of Restrikes 
on EHV 
Side per Φ 
Max. Inter-contact 
Breakdown Voltage 
Max. VFTO 
at 4.16 kV 
Mag. (kV) Seq. Num. Mag. (kV) Seq. Num. 
Max. Inter-contact 
Breakdown Voltage 
Case # 18 among 36 
354.2 467 23.76 444 468 
Max. VFTO 
at 4.16 kV Bus 
Case #28 among 36 
323.6 447 28.77 432 447 
Table 6. Max. Inter-contact Breakdown Voltages vs. Max. VFTO in MV for DS Opening 
(a) GIS-DS opening 
(b) GIS-DS closing 
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Item 
Among the Multiple Restrikes Total Num. 
of Restrikes 
on EHV 
Side per Φ 
Max. Inter-contact 
Breakdown Voltage 
Max. VFTO 
at 4.16 kV 
Mag. (kV) Seq. Num. Mag. (kV) Seq. Num.
Max. Inter-contact 
Breakdown Voltage 
Case #14 among 36 
284.8 1 23.27 12 460 
Max. VFTO 
at 4.16 kV Bus 
Case # 23 among 36 
278.0 1 26.41 26 455 
 
Table 7. Max. Inter-contact Breakdown Voltages vs. Max. VFTO in MV for DS Closing 
3.3.3. Characteristic of VFTO transferring to MV system 
3.3.3.1. Capacitive coupling of high-turn-ratio transformer  
VFTO and the oscillation voltages VOSC (voltages created by preceding restriking that can be 
superimposed to the following restrike) on the EHV side can be transferred to MV system 
through the start-up power transformer via capacitive coupling. The transfer ratio is mainly 
dependent on transformer’s EHV-to-MV interwinding capacitance, transformer’s MV 
winding-to-enclosure capacitance, and the bus-to-ground capacitance of MV system [23]. 
From both our measurement and simulation result, it was observed that the VOSC, which is 
of several tens kV in the EHV GIS, could still be of several kV in the MV system, and this 
will be superimposed to the VFTO coupled from the EHV side causing up to 7 ~ 8.47 times 
the rated line-to-ground peak voltage on MV side. 
3.3.3.2. Superposition of oscillations initiated by a prior strike on top of subsequent restrikes 
Figure 12(a) shows two consecutive restrikes from a multiple-restrike simulation and Fig. 
12(b) shows its counterpart single-strike simulation. It can be seen from Fig. 12(a) that the 
VOSC initiated by the first restrike is superimposed to the second restrike resulting in a 
higher peak voltage (10.72 kV vs. the single strike one of 9.88kV). 
3.3.3.3. Maximum VFTO transferred to MV for DS closing vs. DS opening 
During DS opening the contact distance becomes wider and wider leading to longer 
intervals between two consecutive restrikes while that during DS closing is the opposite. As 
a result, there is a higher probability of superposition of VOSC to subsequent restrike during 
DS closing (thus higher VFTO) than opening. 
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Figure 12. Oscillation Voltage (VOSC) Initiated by a Strike or Restrike Can Be Superimposed to 
Subsequent Restrike Voltages. 
4. Lesson learned and important aspects of NPP power system protection 
design 
Events like the “318 Event” were seldom caused by one single reason. It can be seen from 
the above discussion that Taipower 3rd NPP was under multiple stresses before the event 
and there were mutiple mechanisms for the generation, amplification, and transfering of 
overvoltages which, combined with the operation practices and equipment history, 
eventually led to the explosion of CB#17 and total blackout of the NPP. Below are the key 
lessons learned from this event and their  recommended preventive measure. 
4.1. Bus configuration and fault area isolation 
The “318 Event” was essentially triggered by a single equipment failure but leading to a 
complete blackout of the power plant. There are 2 key lessons learned from this event: (1) 
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Explosion of CB#17 took down the adjacent CB#15 as well. (2) "Independent sources" are not 
always independent due to improper bus configuration. 
For various reason such as space requirement, ease of maintenance, etc, switchgear panels 
are usually installed in the same room side by side. If this cannot be changed, during the 
risk evaluation process one must consider the N-1 condition being loss of "one group of 
equipment" instead of "one equipment" unless sufficient separation are provided between 
the equipments.  
The "independence" of power sources need then be examined closely. If multiple sources 
or multiple buses can be taken down by a single failure such as permenant fault to 
ground, etc, they cannot be considered as independent sources and more backup needs to 
be added.  
It should be noted that during the “318 Event”, after the explosion of CB#17 the plant utility 
room was filled with smoke which makes the manual starting of other diesel generators 
extremely difficult. Not only were equipments under significant stress but also the human 
operators. It is thus recommended that the feasiblity of starting backup sources under utility 
room smoke condition be checked and that any manual operation required during this stage 
be as simple and straightforward as possible with proper interlock to reduce the chance of 
human error which may further escalate the event.  
4.2. Nonlinear resonance prevention 
Among all the scenarios considered in this Chapter, nonlinear resonance is the most difficult 
one to be detected. In view of the potential hazard it could cause, precautionary measure 
must be taken to prevent it from initiating. 
The first step is to prevent motor-generating effect from ever occuring (thus removing the 
key source of initiation.) As explained above, the essential conditions of motor-generating 
effect are (1)  rotating motor with large inertia, (2) large capacitor bank in an isolation 
system to support the terminal voltage. Since a rotating motor with large inertia can not 
be stop immediately, the focus is to remove the capacitive support. In the case of 
Taipower 3rd NPP, the capacitive support came from the long transmission line who were 
tripped only on the remote end. It is recommended that Direct Transfer Trip (DTT) 
function be implemented for transmission line protection to greatly reduce the risk of 
motor generating effect.  
The second step is to ensure effective grounding of transformer neutrals as designed. Due to 
the objective of minimizing short circuit current, the neutral groundings in NPP are usually 
multi-configured: arrestor grounded under normal condition and direct grounding when in 
islanding operation. The switching from one grounding scheme to another often requires 
manual operation and this increases the risks of leaving the islanded system ungrounded as 
well as nonlinear resonance of power. Proper interlock or checking mechanism should be 
implemented to ensure proper grounding as designed at all times. 
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4.3. Neutral voltage transfer  
Neutral voltage transfer can occur via either electromagnetic or capacitive transfer. Based on 
simulation result the risk can be significantly reduced with proper grounding of the neutral. 
This, however, must be carefully implemented in order not to increase the short circuit 
current in the NPP.  
Again, any manual operation during event would introduce extra risks therefore should be 
desigined to be as simple and straightforward as possible with proper interlock or checking 
system. 
4.4. VFTO transferring to MV system 
According to field measurement and numerical simulation, the VFTO transferring to MV 
system is usually underestimated by literatures. As demonstrated by both the field 
measurement and simulation result, peak voltage of VFTO in MV system could be as high 
as 8.47 times the rated line-to-ground peak voltage with an average 466 times restrike 
during DS operating [1,23]. Though the peak VFTO voltages transferred to the MV side are 
usually still within the basic impulse insulation level (BIL) tolerances of the equipment, this 
does not mean that repeatedly striking the equipment with 8.47 times the rated line-to-
ground peak voltage would cause no damages to the equipment. In fact, this can accelerate 
equipment ageing and cause quick degradation of the insulation material and eventually 
leading to equipment breakdown. 
After the “318 Event”, a recommendation was made to Taipower No. 3 Nuclear Power 
Plant in 2003 for the installation of surge absorbers (0.8μF capacitor specially designed for 
surge absorption installed right close to the start-up transformer for each of the three 
phases) on the MV side in Fig. 1 [9,23]. The recommendation was adopted by Taipower in 
March 2005 and a subsequent measurement in March 2006 plus one-year monitoring 
indicated that there were no further VFTO exceeding rated line-to-ground peak voltage 
on the MV system.  
4.5. Maintenance testing of in-service equipments 
The damaged circuit breaker (CB#17) in Taipower 3rd NPP has been put into service for 20 
years at the time of event. Maintenance testing history showed that insulation condition of 
this circuit breaker was good prior to the event however that being the case the circuit 
breaker should not have exploded when faced by transient voltage no higher than its BIL of 
60kV. This shows that the current diagnostic method of insulation degradation (insulation 
resistance measurement, dielectric power factor measurement) may not be sensitive enough 
to detect insulation degradation due to ageing or repeated VFTO strikes. It is recommended 
that the reliability of such tests, including both the tool used, methodology employed, and 
interpretation of testing results (including monitoring the trend of measurement results) be 
further improved. For equipment subject to repeated switching surges, a higher standard 
should be applied.  
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5. Conclusion 
Most NPP’s in the world have been designed in such way that their local power loads are 
provided by “multiple independent sources” to ensure continuous power supply even 
during faulted periods. However, unless the NPP’s local power grid is properly configured 
and its protection system properly designed, all these “multiple independent sources” can 
failed at same time as exemplified by Taipower’s “318 Event”. In view of the many 
similarities in design and other risk factors for world NPP’s, it is of utmost importance that 
the lessons learned from Taipower’s 3rd NPP “318 Event” be properly addressed.  
This Chapter examines the Taipower “318 Event” in detail to demonstrate the various 
possibilities that could leads to NPP blackout. The possibilities investigated include: NPP’s 
location factor, NPP local power grid configuration, cable parameters, switching events, 
switching surges propagating to MV circuits, ferroresonances, remote tripping, and manual 
starting difficulties. The lessons learned and proposed countermeasures are summarized in 
the previous section.  
In summary, to ensure the proper design of NPP power protection system, the following 3 
considerations must be incorporated:  
1. Check Independence of Equipment and Protection Zone for Various Scenarios: The 
“318 Event” was caused by a single CB failure (CB#17) but leading to a complete NPP 
blackout for over 2 hours. This is mainly due to (1) the breakdown of CB#17 took down 
CB#15 at the same time due to their physical proximity. (2) The bus configuration cause 
none of the 2nd, 3rd, or 4th backup power to be available when both CB#15 and #17 both 
fails and CB#15 created a permanent line to ground fault. (3) The last resort (DG5) was 
located in a building filled with smoke caused by the CB#17’s breakdown making 
manual starting extremely challenging. (4) The sustained overvoltage in the system 
could have been avoided should the tripping of the EHV cable be done on both ends of 
the line instead of just the remote end. All of the above suggest that the independence 
of equipment and protection zone have failed and needs to be taken into consideration 
when improving existing or future designs.  
2. Accumulated Equipment Stress Must be Monitored and Considered: Particularly 
relevant for NPP’s located on the seashore and subject to frequent line switching, 
equipment stress manifested in the form of reduced insulation level must be subject to 
more frequent and detailed monitoring. This would include not only absolute value 
measuring but also trending the measurement so that early signs of equipment 
weakness can be identified and proper measures be adopted to address it.   
3. Use System Protection Design Approach: The cause of “motor generating effect”, 
“neutral voltage transfer”, “VFTO”, and “ferroresonance” occurring during the “318 
Event” cannot be addressed one by one and need to be taken into consideration from a 
system protection perspective. This would include the consideration for using different 
tripping scheme (such as Direct Transfer Trip on the EHV line) , adding additional 
protection device (such as installing surge absorbers on the MV bus), as well as 
reconfiguring the bus connections.   
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Abbrevious  
BIL Basic Impulse Level 
CB Circuit Breaker 
DG Diesel Generator 
DS Disconnect Switch 
DTT Direct Transfer Trip 
EHV Extra-High-Voltage 
GIL Gas-Insulated Line 
GIS Gas-Insulated Substation 
HV High Voltage 
LV Low Voltage 
MV Medium Voltage 
NPP Nuclear Power Plant 
VFTO Very Fast Transient Overvoltage 
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